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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
WALTER G. H E N D E R S O N and
HELEN L. HENDERSON, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

Case No.

vs.

13702

HARRY R. MEYER and RONALD
EUGENE MEYER,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment on a jury verdict
in the Second Judicial District Count in and for Davis
County, the Honorable Thornley K. Swan, District Judge.
The verdict returned and judgment thereon found no
cause of action by plaintiffs against either defendant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The matter came on regularly for jury trial before
the Honorable Thornley K. Swan, District Judge, on
March 21, 1974. Upon hearing, the jury returned a
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verdict of no cause of action against either defendant,
and judgment was duly entered by the trial court accordingly. Subsequently, plaintiffs, by and through counsel, filed a Motion for Judgment N. 0. V. or in the Alternative for a New Trial. Said Motion was denied by
the trial court after hearing on April 30, 1974. On May
30, 1974, plaintiffs filed Notice of Appeal in this action,
and the case is now before this Honorable Court pursuant
to that Notice of Appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the lower court's Verdict
and Judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was brought to recover for personal injuries and property damage sustained by pkintiffs-appellants in a two-car accident which occurred on April 22,
1972, on Second West Street between Fourth and Fifth
South Streets in Bountiful, Utah. The accident occurred
when a northbound pickup truck, operated by defendant
Ronald Eugene Meyer and owned by defendant Harry
R. Meyer, collided with the rear-end of a northbound
vehicle operated by plaintiff Helen L. Henderson and
owned by plaintiff Walter G. Henderson.
At trial, substantial credible and uncontroverted evidence was adduced by plaintiffs, including testimony
and admissions from defendant Ronald Eugene Meyer,
requiring the clear conclusion that the above-described
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accident directly and proximately resulted from the negligence of defendant Ronald Eugene Meyer (Tr. 52-60).
Such evidence was not rebutted by defendant.
At the conclusion of presentation of evidence in this
case, plaintiffs moved the trial court for a directed verdict in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants by submission of plaintiffs' Requested Jury Instruction No. 1,
which instruction was not given by the court. (The full
text of this proposed instruction is reproduced under
Point I of the Argument portion of this Brief.) Plaintiffe
duly excepted to the failure of the trial court to grant
such Motion and provide such Instruction.
Subsequent to the giving of the court's mstructions,
the jury retired for deliberation and later returned a verdict of no cause of action, and judgment thereon was
duly entered.
Subsequent to entry of judgment, plaintiffs moved
the trial court, pursuant to the provisions of Rules 50 (b)
and 59(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for a judgment n. o. v. or in the alternative for a new trial. The
trial court by order denied such motion after hearing on
April 30, 1974. On May 30, 1974, plaintiffe filed Notice
of Appeal in this action, and the case is now before this
Honorable Court pursuant to that Notice of Appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT!
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
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FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, OR IN
THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A NEW TRIAL.
At the conclusion of evidence in the instant case,
plaintiffs moved the trial court for a directed verdict in
favor of plaintiffs and against defendants by and through
the submission of plaintiffs' Requested Jury Instruction
No. 1. Said instruction provided: "You are instructed
to return a verdict in favor of plaintiff Helen L. Henderson and against the defendants on the issue of liability."
The trial court did not give plaintiffs' Requested
Instruction No. 1, assigning no reason for its refusal. Upon
the return of the jury verdict of no cause of action herein,
plaintiffs again moved the trial court, pursuant to the
provisions of Rule 59(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
for a judgment n. o. v. or in the alternative a new trial.
The trial court denied such motion upon hearing thereof
on April 30,1974.
It is clear, under the facts of this case, that the
refusal by the trial court to give such instruction and
to grant plaintiffs' Motion for a Directed Verdict and
to grant plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment N. 0. V., or in
the Alternative for a New Trial, constituted clear error,
and that the error is of such magnitude as to require a
reversal and remand of this case to the trial court for
a new trial or other appropriate action.
It is well established as a matter of law that a Mo-
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tion for a Directed Verdict and a Motion for Judgment
N. 0. V. properly lie and should be granted by the trial
court in a case where there are no controverted issues of
fact upon which reasonable men could differ, and where,
without weighing the credibility of the witnesses, there
can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.
Brady v. Southern Railroad, 320 U. S. 476, 64 S. Ct.
232, 88 L. Ed. 329 (1943); Shafer v. Mountain States
Tel. & Telegraph Co., 335 R 2d 444 (9th Cir.. 1964);
Ozark Air Lines, Inc. v. Larimer, 352 F. 2d 9 (8th Cir.
1965); Patterson v. Pizitz, Inc., 353 F. 2d 267 (5th Cir.
1965); Jopek v. New Court Central Railroad, 353 F. 2d
778 (3rd Cir. 1965); Herron v. Maryland Gas Co., 3457
F. 2d 357 (5th Cir. 1965); Adams v. Powell, 351 F. 2d
213 (10th Cir. 1965); Pinehurst, Inc. v. Schlumowitz, 351
F. 2d 509 (4th Cir. 1965); 5A Moore's Federal Practice,
§ 50.02(1) et seq. See also, Pence v. United States, 316
U. S. 332, 62 S. Ct. 1080, 86 L. Ed. 1510 (1942) and
Pollesche v. TransAmerican Ins. Co., 27 Utah 2d 430,
497 P. 2d 236 (1972).
In the leading case of Brady v. Southern Railroad,
supra, the United States Supreme Court had before it
the question of when and under what circumstances a
Motion for a Directed Verdict is properly granted. In
that landmark case, the Supreme Court announced the
standard in the following terms:
When the evidence is such that without
weighing the credibility of the witnesses there
can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the
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verdict, the court should determine the proceedings by non-suit, directed verdict or otherwise in
accordance with the applicable practice without
submission to the jury, or by judgment notwithstanding the verdict. By such direction of
the trial the result is saved from mischance of
speculation over legally unfounded claims (320
U . S . at 479-480).
5A Moore's Federal Practice, § 50.02(1) states the
above rule in somewhat more succinct fashion:
Although the language of the opinions concerning directed verdicts is extremely varied, it
is now clear that a verdict will normally be directed where both the facts and the inferences
to be drawn from the facts point so strongly in
favor of one party that the court believes that
reasonable men could not come to a different
conclusion (At p. 2320).
It is now well established, in applying the above
rule, that an appellate court, in reviewing the action of
a lower court on a Motion for a Directed Verdict, must
consider the evidence in its strongest light in favor of
the party against whom the Motion for Directed Verdict
was made, and give him the advantage of every fair and
reasonable intendment that the evidence can justify.
Upon such a consideration, if the appellate court concludes that the facts adduced in evidence and the inferences to be drawn from the facts point to any conclusion
so strongly that the court concludes that reasonable men
could not come to a different conclusion, the appellate
court is justified in overturning any ruling by the trial
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court on a Motion for a Directed Verdict which is adverse
to or contra that required conclusion. Continental Ore
Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 370 U. S. 690, 82 S. Ct. 1404,
8 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1962); Webb v. Illinois Central Railroad, 352 U. S. 512, 77 S. Ct. 451, 1 L. Ed. 503 (1957);
Girardi v. Gates Rubber Co., 325 F. 2d 196 (9th Cir.
(1963) ;Schnee v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 186 F. 2d
745 (9th Cir. 1951); Austad v. Austad, 2 Utah 2d 49, 269
P. 2d 284.
Applying the above cases and authority to the case
at bar, it is clear that the trial court erred in refusing
to grant plaintiffs' Motion for a Directed Verdict and
plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment N. 0. V. In this case,
the facts adduced at trial and the inferences appropriately
drawn from those facts, point so strongly in favor of the
plaintiffs that it is inconceivable that reasonable men,
in considering those facts, could conclude other than that
plaintiffs were entitled to a verdict and judgment against
defendants.
In the instant case, the undisputed facts disclosed
at trial reveal that the accident which is the subject
matter of this lawsuit occurred on Second West Street
between Fourth and Fifth South Streets in Bountiful,
Utah, when a northbound pickup truck, operated by defendant Ronald Eugene Meyer and owned by defendant
Harry R. Meyer, collided with the rear-end of a northbound vehicle operated by plaintiff Helen R. Henderson
and owned by plaintiff Walter G. Henderson. Upon trial,
the defendant Ronald Eugene Meyer made what is tan-
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tamount to a clear admission of liability and culpability
in the events surrounding the accident. Upon the witness
stand he testified that immediately prior to the accident
and while proceeding northward on Second West Street
he observed a vehicle approaching the roadway on which
he was proceeding. He testified that he observed such
vehicle up to and until he reached its location, thinking
that it was going to pull out onto Second West Street
where he was proceeding. After passing such vehicle
he testified that he turned his head and looked out the
rear window of his truck for some time prior to his
collision with plaintiffs' vehicle.
FROM THE TESTIMONY OF RONALD EUGENE MEYER:
Q. Do you recall stating to the investigating officer in the presence of Mrs. Henderson in
the officer's car that you speeded up when it
appeared to you that this white car was perhaps coming onto the roadway?
A. No. I don't recall that.
Q. Do you believe that you did make such
a statement?
A. No.
Q. And you don't have a present recollection of having speeded up?
A. I am sure that I didn't.
Q. All right. As you passed the driveway,
did you make any observation to the side or to
the rear of this stopped white Rambler?
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A. Yes. I looked over my shoulder after
out the rear window.
Q. All right. This is the rear window of
the pickup?
A. Yes.
Q. Pickup truck?
A. Yes.
Q. And the rear window is right behind
your shoulder in the pickup truck?
A. Just like that (indicating).
Q. Did you turn your head to do that?
A. Yes.
Q. Of course, during that time you were
unable to observe forward on Second West then
to the north of your position. Do you have
a recollection how long a period of time you
spent with your head turned looking at this
stopped Rambler?
A. Oh, it was a time, just a few seconds
I guess.
Q. Do you think maybe three seconds, four
seconds?
A. Oh, I wouldn't know.
Q. Give us your best recollection of the
number of seconds.
A. It was just mainly as I passed him.
Q. Was there any reason to look at him in
view of the fact that you knew that he was
stopped and no danger to you as you passed?
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A. Just to see what — I don't know.
Q. You were curious?
A. I guess.
Q. Did you recognize him or the driver of
this car?
A. No.
Q. All right. Let's take it from the time
that your head is turned looking out the back
window at this white Rambler, tell us in your
own words what happened from that point up
to the time of the impact?
A. Well, when I looked around I seen the
car stopped, so I just applied my brakes and
turned the wheel to the one side.
Q. All right. Now, how far were you from
the Henderson vehicle when you first observed
it?
A. I couldn't say for sure.
Q. Obviously not far enough to stop?
A. Well, yes.
Q. And you made no observation of it previous to that time?
A. No.
Q. Did you at that time observe the turn
signal or brake lights on that vehicle?
A. Well, no. I was too busy stopping. I
didn't — I couldn't see.
Q, Were you able to change the direction
of your truck at all before the impact?
A. No. It just slid kind of sideways.
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Q. Did the Henderson vehicle appear to
be stopped when you first observed it?
A. Yes,
Q. What did it appear that it was doing
or attempting to do?
A. Just as I can recall, it appeared like it
was just coming to a stop. The back bumper of
it was just a little high.
Q. You are not sure whether it was actually
stopped or stopping?
A. I couldn't say.
Q. All right. Did you have any conversation with Mrs. Henderson after this impact occurred?
A. Well, I got out and went and asked her
if she was all right, and if the girl was all right,
and she said after a while, "I think I'm all right,"
but she was rubbing her neck.
Q. Did you hear her complain of any pain in
her neck, back or head at the scene of the accident?
A. She complained of headache in the patrol car.
Q. Are you personally familiar at all with
the progress of her injuries since the date of
the accident and until the present time, do you
have any personal knowledge how she's coming
along?
A. Just what I heard from the lawyers.
From the above, it should be abundantly clear that
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defendant Ronald Eugene Meyer's negligence was clearly
established as a matter of fact and law merely from his
own testimony and admissions. Moreover, when the
other evidence in the case is considered, there is such a
mass of credible and uncontroverted evidence that no
other reasonable conclusion is possible. Certainly no
appreciable or legally-sufficient evidence was adduced requiring the conclusion that plaintiff Helen L. Henderson
was sufficiently negligent or contributorily negligent to
justify the verdict returned by the jury in this matter
and the subsequent judgment entered thereon by the trial
court, or that any other appreciable legal defense for said
defendant's actions exists. Thus, the trial court committed dear error in denying plaintiffs' Motion for a
Directed Verdict and thereby permitting this case to go
to the jury on the liability issue. Further, the trial court
committed dear error, for substantially the same reason,
is denying plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment N. 0. V., or
in the Alternative for a New Trial. This Court should
reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the
case for appropriate proceedings.
POINT II.
THE FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS MADE
BY THE JURY IN THIS CASE WERE
AGAINST THE WEIGHT AND PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE AND CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
Even assuming, arguendo that the trial court did not
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err in refusing to grant plaintiffs' Motion for a Directed
Verdict and plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment N. 0. V., it
is clear that the factual determinations made by the jury
in the instant case were clearly and manifestly erroneous
and inconsistent with the weight of evidence adduced at
trial. As a result, this Court should reverse the judgment
of the trial court and remand this case for a new trial
or other appropriate proceedings.
It is clear that an appellate court, in considering and
reviewing the correctness and propriety of a ruling by
a lower court on a Motion for a Directed Verdict and
Motion for Judgment N. 0. V. is required to view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party against
whom the Motion was made. An appellate court also
possesses, however, power to review the evidence generally to determine whether there in any substantia!
evidence supportive of the verdict of the trier of fact
or whether the determinations made by the trier of fact
are so manifestly against the weight and preponderance
of the evidence adduced at trial as to require reversal.
See cases cited supra. See also, Consolidated Edison
Co. v. NLRB, 305 U. S. 197, 59 S. Ot. 266, 83 L. Ed. 126
(1938); Riggs v. U. S., 280 F. 2d 949 (5th Cir. 1960);
Terminal Railroad Assoc, v. Fitzjohn, 165 F. 2d 473 (8th
Cir. 1948).
In the instant case, even the most cursory review
of the evidence adduced at trial discloses that the verdict of the jury was manifestly against the weight and
preponderance of the evidence. (See the discussion of
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the evidence provided in Point I of the Argument portion
of this Brief.) The verdict of the jury in this case so
flies in the face of all the evidence adduced and is so
plainly inexplicable and unjustifiable that it should astound even the most experienced judge. Appellants can
only conclude that the verdict was a product of passion
or prejudioe against the plaintiffs. This Court should
reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this
case to the trial court for appropriate proceedings.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in refusing to grant plaintiffsappellants' Motion for a Directed Verdict and plaintiffsappellants' Motion for Judgment N. O. V., or in the
Alternative for a New Trial. Moreover, the verdict of
the jury in the instant case was against the weight and
preponderance of the evidence and clearly erroneous.
This Court should reverse the judgment of the trial
court and remand this case to the district court for appropriate proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,

THOMAS A. JONES
ANTHONY M. THURBER
Attorneys for Appellants
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